INTRODUCTION
Future wide-area data networks will offer host-to-host bandwidth exceeding that available on current local-area networks [22, 24] . We hypothesize that these networks will be used to build very large scale distributed systems having the following properties:
Sharing of resources (processing power, data, comnmnication services) over long distances is possible, is wellintegrated (perhaps transparently) in the system, and is efficient.
The system spans organizations and individuals that may wish to share resourees, but that do not trust each other. They demand strict control over their own resourees and the ability to function autonomously.
Resource access uses diverse communication protocols, including both requestheply and stream-oriented protocols.
Hardware components in general have no physical security.
Some hosts, including those acting as network gateways, may be loaded with arbitrary kernel software Most existing and proposed distributed systems make security-related assumptions that are incompatible with one or more of the above properties of large-scale systems. A sampling of these assumptions: q All system-level components (kernels and network) trust one another.
Once a user is authenticated to the lecal kernel (via a password mechanism, perhaps)
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There is a single administrative agent that can punish security violators, e.g. by firing them. It is therefore sufficient to detect, rather than prevent, sceurity violations.
Resource sharing across administrative domains is pos- It can provide severrd levels of end-to-end security.
q It has several advantages over designs in which the security mechanism is at a higher level of the protocol hierarchy,
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the abstraction offered by ADP, section 3 gives its design, and section 4 discusses its implementation.
Section 5 compares ADP to other designs for secure network conununication, and section 6 offers some conclusions. These conditions all require some form of correctness on the part of the kernel software; methods of ensuring this are outside the scope of this paper (see [8] ). Condition 4 also requires that one of the following hold:
a) The host is physically accessible only to its current owner.
b) There is no mechanism for reading the kernel's secret key storage. An example of such a mechanism is a "reset button" that jumps into a ROM monitor without first destroying the keys, or if a hardware failure generates a memory dump to a file or device readable by anyone other than the kernel owner.
An owner X is kernel-trustworthy if whenever X owns a kernel, it is security-correct. ADP delivers a message tagged with the owner-name X, it guarantees that the following hold:
q If X has placed kernel-trust only in kernel-trustworthy owners, then the message resulted from a call to ADP-send (see below) at the request of a process owned by X, and was directed to this port.
q If the nzux_age argument was present on port registration, the message was generated no more than that long ago.
Message Sending
The ADP primitive to send a secure message is:
ADP-send( message daw local_owneC name; remote_host:
name; remote~ti port_ID; privacy: boolean; max_delay: time;
ADP send sends the given message to the named port on the de~tination host. Loca170wner must own a process currently running on this host (m particular, the kernel must hold the private key of the owner).
If the owner of the remote host is kernel-trustworthy, and the named port exists, then the message will be delivered only to that port, and will be tagged with the name of the sending owner. ADP optionally provides privacy: more precisely, ADP guarantees that if the calling kernel is securitycorrect, the following holds:
If the privacy flag is set, the text of the message will be readable only by kernels with the same owner as the kernel owner of remote host.
The tnm_delay argument is a hint to the kernel that the message can be buffered for up to that amount of time before it is transmitted. This is used to encourage encryption piggybacking (see section 3.1).
ADP also provides the following primitives: 
End-to-end Seeurity
In our model of distributed computation, a process has no privacy from the kernel on which it runs. Its address space is completely visible to the kernel. If the kernel is not security-correct, it can alter or publicize any data accessible to the user process. Hence no additional security is obtained by doing encryption at higher kernel levels or in user processes.
The host-to-host mechanism used by ADP, together with the seeunty-corredness of the kernel, provide, in our model, as much end-to-end seeurity as is possible without the use of external mechanisms.
THE DESIGN OF ADP
The design of ADP can be summarized as follows: it uses host-to-host secure channels and demand-driven authentication, caching authentication information where possible (see Figure 1) .
The ADP module on each host maintains, for each secure channel, two lists of owners:
(1) Owners that it has authenticated to the other end of the channel.
( It is then possible for a kernel to establish secure channels, and do authentication on those channels, in advance of user demand (e.g. at boot time).
The security functions of ADP reduce to secure channels and owner authentication.
In general, both must be implemented cryptographically; in some cases, a cheaper solution may be possible. In some cases ADP must handle fragmentation of long messages; this will not be considered here.
An ADP message consists of an ADP header and zero or more user messages. The ADP header can contain a secure channel request or acknowledgement, zero or more "authentication signatures", zero or more authentication requests, a sequence number, a timestamp (used for replay elimination), and a cryptographic checksum [2, 12] of the entire ADP message. Each user message has a header containing the port number, and the message data. These messages are separated by the reeeiver's ADP module, and delivered to the appropriate port.
If user messages do not require privacy, encryption can be limited to the cheeksum in the ADP header. Furthermo~, on a broadcast LAN like Ethernet the checksum can be replaced by an encrypted sequence number transmitted as a trailer.
In order to obtain a trailer, a potential intruder must allow the trailer and all the preceding data to be transmitted. These are therefore seen by the intended recipient, who will therefore recognize and reject any malicious reuse of the trailer.
In either case, it may be possible to piggyback multiple user messages into a single ADP message, thereby reducing the encryption cost per user message. Key server replication in a single-key scheme increases its vulnerability to attack on secrecy, whereas it reduces the vulnerability of public-key systems.
Current public-key encryption algorithms are too slow to consider using them to encrypt each message sent. On the other hand, single-key operations are fast enough to be employed for each message. In ADP a public-key scheme is used to bootstrap into a single-key scheme.
3.2.1.
Cryptographic Implementation of Secure Channels When a host X needs to establish a secure channel to a host Y, it sends a channel establishment request to Y as part of the header of an ADP message. This request contains random strings S and T encrypted with the public key of the owner of Y. S will be used as the secret single-key of the secure channel, and T will be used to authenticate owners from Y to X. X marks the secure channel as being tentative until it receives an acknowledgement.
The secure channel request is included with ADP messages sent while the channel is still tentative.
Y sends to X a random string R to be used for sigttatures sent from X to Y in the secure channel acknowledgement and in every ADP message until the first signature is received.
If two hosts simultaneously try to establish a channel with each other, the one with the lexicographicslly greater name determines the channel key.
Cryptographic Implementation of Owner Authentication
Public-key encryption is used for signatures [1, 11, 13 ].
An owner's signature is the random string agreed upon during secure channel establishment, encrypted with the private key of the owner. To check the validity of a signature, the receiver of a signature obtains the public key of the owner from the name server, deaypts the signature with the public key, and checks if the resulting string is the correct random sting.
Trust Domains
Suppose a group of hosts and the communication channels between them are physically secure, and that the owners with access to the hosts all place kernel-trust in one another.
We call such a group a trust hnain.
Encryption-based security mechanisms are necessary only for communication across the domain boundary.
Suppose also that all comtnunication across the boundary is routed through one or more hosts called domain gatewuys.
Then it is possible to have a special ADP module on a domain gateway +&at handles packet forwarding.
It handles secure channels and authentication on behalf of hosts within the domain, transparently to kernel and user level clients and to higher level protocols. This has the following advantages: 
COMPARISON WITH OTHER ARCHITECTURES FOR SECURE COMMUNICATION
We have proposed putting security in a layer just above (or combined with) the network layer.
We now list the advantages of this approach in three parts: 1) general advantages of ADP 2) specific advantages relative to transport layer security 3) specific advantages relative to upper layer security 4.1. General Advantages of ADP Putting security at the level of host to host datagrams has several advantages:
It simplifies transport level protocols. When a host crashes, its secure channels ate destroyed. Thus remote host crashes are detected at the host-to-host level at the time of secure channel establishment. In combination with the elimination of duplicates and the limiting of replay delay, this means that 3-way handshakes can often be eliminated from transport-level protocols.
Three-way handshakes can be eliminated from stream and requesth-eply protocols. A short transaction then requires just two messages, as opposed to at least 6 in TCP and 4 in secure RPC.
Security functions
need not be duplicated in multiple transport protocols or user programs.
There am two public-key operations per owner eer remote host per kernel se&ion.
Often~ese operations can be done at boot time or during idle periods. There are no per-process or per-operation public-key opera-I 704.2.
[16]
tions, resulting in a substantial performance gain.
As was shown in section 3, security at the host-to-host datagram level allows heterogeneity in implementation and flexibility to change the implementation without the need to change any of the higher level protocols.
Since messages from all client processes and higher level protocols pass through ADP, a number of these messages destined to a common remote host can all be combined into a single datagrarn and authenticated once using the channel secret key.
This If an intruder sends a false message with the conect transport level sequence number, the transport level protocol will accept it as the next message and reject the true message which may arrive later. The secure communication mechanisms above will reject the false message correctly but will never get the true message. False acknowledgements at lower levels can disrupt the sequencing.
The only way to recover from such situation is to re-establish the connection at both the transport and the secure communication levels. This has the potential for a lot of unnecessary tearing down of connections and the associated performance overhead.
Replayed
and unauthenticated messages are detected only at the upper level. These messages are unnecessarily processed at all lower levels of the protocol hierarchy. 
